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ABSTRACT 
Optical networks play a crucial role in the provisioning of grid and cloud computing services. Their 
high bandwidth and low latency characteristics effectively enable universal users’ access to 
computational and storage resources that thus can be fully exploited without limiting performance 
penalties. Given the rising importance of such cloud/grid services hosted in (remote) data centers, the 
various users (ranging from academics, over enterprises, to non-professional consumers) are 
increasingly dependent on the network connecting these data centers, that must be designed to ensure 
maximal service availability, i.e., minimizing interruptions. In this chapter we will outline the 
challenges encompassing the design, i.e., dimensioning, of large-scale backbone (optical) networks 
interconnecting data centers. This amounts to extensions of the classical routing and wavelength 
assignment algorithms (RWA) to so-called anycast RWA, but also pertains to jointly dimensioning 
not just the network but also the data center resources (i.e., servers). We specifically focus on 
resiliency, given the criticality of the grid/cloud infrastructure in today’s businesses, and, for highly 
critical services, we also include specific design approaches to achieve disaster resiliency. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Back in the 1960s, John McCarthy envisioned the concept of “computation as a public utility”, 
making computing power equally easily accessible as the classical utilities that provide users with 
water, gas, and electricity. That seminal idea reappeared in the 1990s under the form of grid 
computing, borrowing its name from the power grid, where “the grid” was aimed to be a highly 
powerful computing resource that scientists could easily tap into for performing challenging tasks. 
Similarly, today’s cloud computing paradigm is built on the idea of relieving the user from worrying 
about the resources required to run applications and to store data, as well as on the idea of enabling 
access to such applications and data from basically any device. Clearly, such concept can be made 
possible only through a high capacity and low latency network that connects the user to “the cloud”, 
i.e., the distributed computing/storage resources. Undeniably, development of optical network 
technology has been a major driver that enabled the realization of such grids/clouds.  
The rise of broadband access networks, and high speed optical networking in wide area networks 
(WAN) has increased the geographical scale of distributed computing paradigms, extending their 
range from on-site computing facilities to the cost-efficient aggregation of IT resources for both 
processing and storage in large scale data centers. These now can supply a broad spectrum of 
applications, serving a wide audience ranging from end consumers, over business users, to scientists 
requiring high performance computing (HPC) facilities. Basic concepts underlying so-called grid 
technology, originating in the e-Science domain (e.g., to process massive data flows from the large 
hadron collider (LHC) at CERN, in Switzerland, used for the Higgs boson discovery), meanwhile 
evolved to today’s cloud applications. For a more elaborate discussion of these applications, as well as 
relevant optical technology that can help to meet their challenging requirements, we refer to 
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(Develder, De Leenheer, et al., 2012). The resulting optical grid/cloud constituents are summarized in 
Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. An optical grid/cloud interconnects various data sources (experimental facilities, sensors, 
etc.) to infrastructure for data storage and processing (data centers, high performance computing, 
etc.) to deliver services to various types of users. Such a distributed architecture owes its success to 
optical networking infrastructure, both in backbone and access networks. (Adapted from (Develder, 
De Leenheer, et al., 2012)). 
 
Given that virtually all types of today’s applications heavily rely on network connectivity, as well as 
the IT resources that constitute the work horses of the grid/cloud, it is crucial that this infrastructure is 
able to provide the services resiliently. Protection of cloud service and traditional traffic protection 
vary in nature. In the optical layer (which is the focus area of this chapter), protection of traffic 
between two nodes is generally provided by provisioning a backup path between the nodes. In an 
optical cloud, a specific service/content is generally available from multiple locations (such as data 
centers or servers). Thus, we no longer need to provide backup path between the requesting node and 
the server node as the service can be continued/restored from another location after a failure. Cloud 
service protection also includes protection of content that is an integral part of the service. Routing 
and protection of connections and services largely depend on the placement of content, which itself is 
another important problem in a cloud. Thus, protection of services in a cloud has different 
requirements than traditional traffic and can benefit from distinct protection methods. Moreover, 
large-scale network failures due to natural disasters and intentional attacks pose a major problem. 
Although upper layer schemes (such as TCP retransmission, IP layer re-routing, etc.) are in place to 
recover from a network failure, they are incapable of dealing with disaster failures, mostly since they 
are spatially correlated and may require cross-layer signaling between the optical backbone and the 
upper layers. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: we start by introducing the general problem of 
resilient optical grid/cloud dimensioning, highlighting the fundamental principles of anycast routing 
and relocation. After providing a short literature overview of the resulting anycast routing and 
wavelength allocation (ARWA) problem, we will discuss two particular problems. The first is to 
dimension jointly the server and network capacities for an optical cloud, for which we propose an 
Integer Linear Programming (ILP) formulation and a scalable solving method based on column 
generation. Results on a case study on a European network topology are then presented. This first 
problem is rather generic, and will decide to route traffic to possibly 2 different locations (one for 
failure-free conditions, the other in case of resource failures), using a generic failure model (i.e., the 
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shared risk group concept). We then move to a second problem, presenting a specific approach to 
provide protection against disasters, in a scenario where we need to provide content placement 
(replication) in geographically scattered data centers, and network connectivity towards them. Here, 
data will thus be served at multiple (esp. more than 2) locations. Also in this case, we provide various 
solution methods (based on ILP, LP relaxations and heuristics) for that case of disaster resiliency. 
Finally, we conclude the chapter with a summary and possible future work. 
 
We would like to point out that the problem of coordinated protection in cloud/network infrastructure 
is very challenging and presents a very high computational complexity.	  Computationally effective 
approaches must be devised for the solution of these classes of problems on realistic network 
instances. In this chapter we therefore describe possible solution methods based on LP relaxations, 
heuristics, and column generation, without claiming completeness, but with the intent of providing 
guidelines to devise scalable solution methods for similar problems arising in the context of resilient 
optical grid/cloud networks. 
 
THE PROBLEM OF RESILIENT GRID/CLOUD DIMENSIONING 
In this chapter, we study how to dimension optical grids/clouds, answering the question: What amount 
of resources, i.e., both network and server capacity, do we need to cater for a given demand for 
grid/cloud services? Our case studies will assume a particular user request can be served by a single 
data center, i.e., at a particular location (which however can be chosen out of a set of candidate sites). 
This assumption is representative of so-called bag-of-tasks applications in the e-science domain, as 
well as requests for the provisioning of virtual machines (VMs) in case of infrastructure-as-a-service 
(IaaS) clouds. The applications that we consider in our dimensioning studies can be seen as 
abstractions of any of these services, as our modeled applications imply non-negligible bandwidth and 
server (storage and/or computation) requirements. 
 
In light of the high bandwidth requirements associated with such grid/cloud applications (Develder, 
De Leenheer, et al., 2012), we focus on optical circuit-switched networks exploiting wavelength 
division multiplexing (WDM). We particularly focus on backbone networks interconnecting various 
geographically spread data centers: intra-data center networks connecting the various server racks 
within a single data center will not be further discussed here (for a recent discussion of optics within 
the data center, see (Glick, Krishanmoorthy, & Schow, 2011). In the domain of backbone WDM 
networks, a substantial body of research literature already has widely addressed the offline 
dimensioning network problem. Yet, in the particular grid/cloud context addressed here, those works 
are not directly applicable. First of all, we need also to consider (and optimize the dimensions, hence 
cost, of) the server resources and their location, in addition to the network resources (i.e., 
wavelengths on each of the network links in WDM terms). Secondly, in classical WDM network 
design a so-called traffic matrix is assumed, specifying the amount of requests between any pair of 
optical network nodes. In a grid/cloud context we however do not a priori know the end points of such 
requests: grid/cloud users typically do not care where exactly their workload is processed (“in the 
cloud”), and therefore freedom arises to choose the most appropriate location for the data center to 
serve their requests. This concept of routing where the destination is not fully specified a priori, but 
rather can be freely chosen among a set of candidate locations is generally known as anycast routing 
(Partridge, Mendez, & Milliken, 1993). Therefore, the classical routing and wavelength assignment 
(RWA) needs to be rephrased as anycast routing and wavelength assignment (ARWA). We provide an 
overview of initial work in this arena in the following section. 
 
Also resiliency, even before the advent of grids/clouds, has always been a major concern in optical 
networks given the traffic volumes affected by, e.g., a single failing optical channel or fiber. A 
popular basic principle to offer protection against failures of optical equipment is that of path 
protection: a primary path, running between source and destination of the request, is protected by a 
disjoint alternate (backup) path that does not share any possibly failing network resource with the 
primary. In light of the aforementioned anycast routing principle, we have proposed the idea of 
exploiting relocation (Buysse, De Leenheer, Dhoedt, & Develder, 2009), illustrated in Figure 2: the 
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backup path may end in a destination that possibly differs from that under failure-free conditions. 
Thus, we can save network resources (since the path to an alternate data center may be shorter than 
any other alternate path to the original one that is disjoint from the primary), as well as be protected 
against failure of server resources at the primary destination. Such relocation is crucial in both studies 
that we will present below. But first, let us briefly sketch the existing body of research work in the 
context of ARWA. 
 
 
Figure 2. The relocation principle: since grid/cloud users are not very much concerned about the 
exact location where requests are being served, we can choose an alternate location to save network 
resources when failures affect the primary destination. 
 
ANYCAST ROUTING AND WAVELENGTH ASSIGNMENT (ARWA) 
In essence, the anycast routing problem amounts to finding a path from a source to a destination to be 
chosen among a given set of candidate destinations, while minimizing a certain cost (bandwidth used, 
delay, etc.). This has been considered in packet switched IP networks (Tim Stevens et al., 2007), or 
even optical burst switched (OBS) networks (Bathula & Elmirghani, 2009; De Leenheer et al., 2006). 
As indicated above, we consider anycast routing in optical circuit-switched (OCS) networks, where it 
amounts to the so-called anycast routing and wavelength assignment (ARWA) problem. We thus need 
to find so-called wavelength paths and minimize, e.g., the total number of wavelengths used summed 
over all network links, and/or the load on the links (Tang, Jia, Wang, & Wang, 2003). 
 
The offline problem, where all requests are given at once and are considered to be static, has been 
proposed to be solved in three sequential phases (Din, 2005): (1) decide on the destination for each 
request, (2) route the paths for each (source, destination)-pair, (3) do the wavelength assignment for 
each path. A heuristic algorithm based on simulated annealing and genetic algorithms has been shown 
to outperform the former phased strategy (Din, 2007). Also applying on heuristics, (Hyytiä, 2004) and 
(Walkowiak, 2010) address generalized offline RWA where the requests are not solely anycast, but 
also include unicast (and in the case of Hyytiä et al. also multicast) requests. An online routing 
problem (while also briefly raised by Walkowiak, 2010) is studied specifically by Bhaskaran et al., 
who assume the number of anycast sites varies over time, according to a time-varying load 
(Bhaskaran, Triay, & Vokkarane, 2011). In (Bathula & Elmirghani, 2009), the authors propose 
anycast routing methods to improve the performance of reconfigurable WDM networks under the 
variations in the IP traffic. In (Tim Stevens, De Leenheer, De Turck, Dhoedt, & Demeester, 2006), 
authors show that the anycast routing problem can be reduced to unicast routing. Consequently, 
unicast routing algorithms (complemented by some specific constraints) can be applied to compute an 
optimal path based on several server selection criteria and achieve an effective distribution of the job 
scheduling requests. 
 
The studies mentioned so far do not address resiliency: they only find a single working path. The 
online problem of finding not only a primary, but also a backup path, is addressed in (She, Huang, 
Zhang, Zhu, & Jue, 2007): they propose an algorithm based on an auxiliary graph, modeling also 
grooming, to find a working and backup route for a single anycast request. The offline problem, which 
is the focus of this chapter, has been addressed in (Walkowiak & Rak, 2011) by considering joint 
optimization of anycast and unicast requests that are protected against single link failures with shared 
backup paths. 
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All works discussed above only address dimensioning the capacity of the optical network. However, 
here we are interested not only in the network, but also in the data center resources (i.e., the amount of 
servers for storage and/or computation). The online routing problem, taking both network and server 
constraints into account, has been discussed in, e.g., (Demeyer, De Leenheer, Baert, Pickavet, & 
Demeester, 2008; T. Stevens et al., 2009). Here, we are focusing on the offline dimensioning of a 
grid/cloud for a given set of multiple requests. Another approach related to resilient design methods 
for virtual networks minimizing the cost or the latency of the virtual network in presence of link and 
data center failures is reported in (Barla, Schupke, & Carle, 2012).In our previous study, we 
considered the basic case without offering resiliency, and propose a phased approach to both decide 
on the location of the data center sites, their capacity, and subsequently the network capacity 
(Develder, Mukherjee, Dhoedt, & Demeester, 2009). Here, we will further integrate the dimensioning 
process and offer resiliency, subsequently also explore the specific case of disaster resiliency, with the 
additional complexity of placement of contents in a selected subset of the data centers. 
In the approaches discussed below, we present solutions to resilient dimensioning, jointly determining 
server and network capacities. Note that in our case studies, a single request will eventually be served 
at a single location (which however might depend on the failure condition): accommodating requests 
that comprise a set of interdependent tasks is a largely unaddressed problem, although some have 
proposed solutions to the non-resilient online routing and scheduling problem (X. Liu et al., 2009; X. 
Liu, Qiao, Yu, & Jiang, 2010). 
 
The following section will discuss a first, generic problem of dimensioning jointly the server and the 
network resources to resiliently provide cloud services, exploiting so-called relocation. After this, we 
will present a second study on providing disaster resiliency. 
 
JOINT DIMENSIONING OF RESILIENT SERVER AND NETWORK INFRASTRUCTURE 
This first case study solves the offline dimensioning problem for optical grids/clouds comprising a 
backbone network of interconnected optical cross connects (OXCs), where some of these are 
collocated with data centers. A formal problem statement, as depicted in Figure 3, is: 
Given 
• The topology, comprising the sites where the grid/cloud requests originate, as well as the 
optical network of OXCs interconnecting them; 
• The demand stating the amount of requests originating each single site; and 
• The survivability requirements, detailing the failure scenarios that should be protected against, 
• Candidate data center site locations, of out which up to? K should be chosen, 
Find 
• The K data center locations where server infrastructure should be provided; 
• The destination site(s) and routes thereto for each of the requests in the demand, under each 
possible failure scenario; and 
• The network and server capacity to provide on each of the network links (i.e., number of 
wavelengths) and in each of the K data centers (i.e., number of servers). 
Such that the total network and data center resource capacity is minimized. 
 
 
Figure 3. The problem we address is to dimension the optical backbone network comprising optical 
cross connects (OXCs) and data centers, required to meet a given demand of grid/cloud requests with 
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known sources. We will decide on the location of the data centers, as well as the amount of bandwidth 
and server capacity. (Adapted from (Develder et al., 2011).) 
 
The ‘requests’ in this problem statement will be expressed in abstract unit capacities, and can be 
interpreted as a certain volume of “jobs” from grid applications (see above, especially bag-of-task 
types), but in the cloud case, one can use the same model and interpret “requests” to refer to virtual 
machines (VMs) to be provisioned in IaaS clouds. The demand will be expressed as request arrival 
intensity, and a unit capacity will be associated with a certain amount of server capacity (to be 
interpreted as storage and/or processing power, e.g., a single CPU) as well as a certain network 
bandwidth (a wavelength in the assumed optical circuit-switched network context). Our model is 
generic and can be used both for data- and computing-intensive grid/cloud scenarios. 
 
The ‘survivability’ addressed will involve protection against single failures of either a bi-directional 
network link, or a server at one of the data center locations. Yet, note that the mathematical model we 
use to solve the problem is generic and can cater for any failure that can be represented as a so-called 
shared risk link group (SRLG): a set of links that can simultaneously fail, because they share a 
common dependency. Thus, a failing server will be modeled by a failure of a link connecting it to the 
rest of the network. 
We will cater for failures with minimal resource requirements by sharing/reusing capacity: the same 
wavelength (and similarly, the same server in a data center) may be used as backup capacity under 
disjoint failure scenarios, i.e., to protect against failures of different resources. Also, we will exploit 
relocation as explained before, if this allows for a reduction in the overall network and server 
capacity. 
 
Solution approach and network model 
Our solution to the above resilient optical grid/cloud dimensioning problem comprises two steps: 
• Step 1: Find the K best locations where it is most beneficial (as to minimize both network and 
server resources) to install data centers. 
• Step 2: Determine the amount of network capacity (i.e., number of wavelengths on each of the 
link) and data center capacity (i.e., number of servers) to install, based on appropriate choices 
of so-called working paths (under failure free conditions) and backup paths for all grid/cloud 
traffic. 
Clearly, the resource dimensions found in step 2 will depend on the choice of K in step 1 (see further, 
e.g., Figure 4). Solving the two steps jointly however is quite complex (see e.g., first attempts in 
(Jaumard et al., 2012). Here we will limit the discussion to the 2-stage approach. 
 
Step 1 can be rephrased as a well-known k-medoids clustering problem (Develder et al., 2009), for 
which, e.g., heuristic approaches exist (Park & Jun, 2009). Yet, in our context we can quickly solve 
the problem using an integer linear programming (ILP) approach, as explained in detail below. Step 2 
will be solved using linear programming techniques as well. Whereas it is possible to elegantly 
formulate the problem as a conventional ILP, solving the Step 2 problem for large problem instances 
(in terms of topology size and number of unit requests) is not scalable, and hence we successfully use 
a column generation (CG) approach. This generic technique to solve large problems limits the number 
of so-called configurations that are explicitly considered in the model, where typically a combinatorial 
explosion of the number of possible configurations occurs. 
In CG, the linear program (LP) only considers a subset of all possible configurations. (In our case, a 
configuration comprises a combination of a working and a backup path.) Starting from an initial 
(limited) set of configurations C, a so-called restricted master problem (RMP) determines the optimal 
combination of configurations (restricted to those in C). In a next step, a so-called pricing problem 
finds a new configuration c that could improve the value of the objective function of the RMP. If such 
a c can be found, it is added to C, whereupon the master problem (with the extended C) is solved 
again. Using that as an input, the pricing problem (PP) looks for a new configuration, etc.: this process 
of adding new configurations and re-solving the RMP is repeated until the PP no longer finds new 
configurations. For more details on column generation, we refer to, e.g., (Desrosiers & Lübbecke, 
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2005; Vanderbeck & Wolsey, 1996) and specifically for its application to the RWA problem to 
(Jaumard, Meyer, & Thiongane, 2009). 
 
Before presenting the ILPs, we first introduce the network model as illustrated in Figure 3 and its 
variables: 
• 𝐺 = 𝑉, 𝐿  is the directed graph, with nodes 𝑉 and directed edges 𝐿, constituting the optical 
grid/cloud. 
• 𝑉 = 𝑉!"# ∪ 𝑉!"# ∪ 𝑉!"# is the set of all nodes, which is partitioned in the set of optical 
switches (the OXCs) 𝑉!"#, the data center sites 𝑉!"# (with 𝑉!"# = 𝐾), and the explicitly 
modeled sources of the requests 𝑉!"# . 
• 𝐿 = 𝐿!"# ∪ 𝐿!"# ∪ 𝐿!"# includes the backbone network links 𝐿!"# interconnecting the 
OXCs, the links 𝐿!"#  that originate at the sources and hence can be interpreted as 
representations of the access network links (where possibly an appropriate cost factor can be 
added), and the 𝐿!"# links towards a data center. Note that 𝐿!"#  and 𝐿!"# usually have no 
direct correspondence to a single real-life link; e.g., the data source can be accessing the core 
through a particular, multi-hop, access network technology. Yet, in particular LDST are 
modeled to be able to represent failing servers as link failures. 
• ∆! indicates the number of unit requests originating at node 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉!"# . Here, a unit request is 
interpreted as requiring a single wavelength as well as a single server. (The model can be 
extended by only using ∆!for network capacity requests, and decouple the server resource 
requirements in a separate server demand Γ!; in the following we however stick to 
corresponding network and server requirements in a single demand vector ∆!.) 
• The set of SRLGs 𝑆, with elements 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 representing a set of links that could be jointly 
affected by the same root failure cause and hence simultaneously fail. Note that this modeling 
as SLRGs is very generic, and in our numerical case studies we will particularly focus on 
single failures of bidirectional links or servers. 
Note that the network links that will be used to derive the total network capacity comprise only 𝐿!"# 
(where wavelengths will be the units of capacity). In fact, links 𝐿!"# will rather be used to determine 
the total server capacity: the number of capacity units on link 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿!"# will represent the number of 
servers to install in the data center represented by the node 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉!"# that 𝑙 connects to.  
 
Step 1: Choosing the K data center locations 
First of all, we find the best locations to install data centers: we decide on 𝑉!"#. Thus, we assume only 𝑉!"# ∪ 𝑉!"# is given, and we need to pick and choose 𝐾 locations out of 𝑉!"# (or a subset thereof) 
where to attach data center nodes (thus adding 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉!"# to the topology to be further used in Step 2). 
We define and solve an ILP, under the following simplifying assumptions: (a) all requests originating 
at the same source 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉!"#  will be sent to the same data center location, (b) the choice for a 
particular data center location will be based on shortest path routing. The latter implies that a source 𝑣 
will send its requests to a data center attached to 𝑣′ only if for some routing metric ℎ!!! expressing the 
‘distance’ between 𝑣 and 𝑣′ this is the minimum over all values ℎ!!!! (i.e., over all 𝐾 possible 
destinations 𝑣′′). 
 
The ILP for choosing 𝐾 locations, as we originally proposed without considering resilience (Develder 
et al., 2009), uses the following decision variables and given parameters: 
• 𝑡! is a binary decision variable that will be 1 if the site 𝑣 is chosen as one of the 𝐾 data center 
locations, 
• 𝑓!!! is a binary decision variable that will be 1 if and only if requests from source node 𝑣 are 
sent to a data center attached to 𝑣′, 
• ℎ!!! is a given parameter that accounts for the cost of having a unit request being sent from 𝑣 
to 𝑣′. 
Since we aim to minimize resource capacity, which for the network amounts to the number of used 
wavelengths summed over all links, and a unit request represents the use of a single wavelength, ℎ!!! 
will be measured as hop count of the shortest path between 𝑣 and 𝑣′. Our ILP thus becomes: 
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  min ∆! ∙ ℎ!!! ∙ 𝑓!!!!!!∈!!"#!∈!!"#   (1) 
Subject to: 
 𝑡!!∈!!"# = 𝐾   (2) 
 𝑓!!!!!∈!!"# = 1 ∀𝑣 ∈ 𝑉!"#  (3) 
 𝑓!!! ≤ 𝑡!! ∀𝑣, 𝑣! ∈ 𝑉!"# (4) 
 
To account also for capacity that will be required for backup against failures, we define1 ℎ!!! as the 
length of the shortest combination of two link-disjoint paths between 𝑣 and 𝑣′ (as found by, e.g., 
(Suurballe & Tarjan, 1984)).  
 
Note that the problem of data-center location in a network is a special case of the generic problem of 
network hub location that applies to any kind of facilities that serve as switching, shipment and 
sorting points in a distribution system under different assumption and configurations. For an overview 
of such problems, we refer to (Alumur & Kara, 2008). 
  
Step 2: Dimensioning the network and data centers 
Once we fixed the 𝐾 locations of the data centers in Step 1, we need to find the actual routes for each 
individual request, as to ensure minimal network and server capacity requirements. Note that this 
routing can differ from the simplifying assumptions taken in Step 1: multiple unit requests originating 
from the same source could in principle take different routes to different destinations, and those routes 
don’t necessarily coincide with a shortest path as found to calculate the ℎ∗ metrics. 
 
We will indeed look for routes such that backup capacity can be maximally shared among backup 
paths whose corresponding primary paths (i.e., those under failure-free conditions) are disjoint. 
Failures that we consider are single bidirectional network link failures, and single server failures. For 
the latter, we will assume 1:𝑁 server protection, implying that per 𝑁 servers, we will add 1 extra for 
protection purposes. In terms of modeling, every failure scenario will be represented as a set of jointly 
failing modeled links, aka an SRLG: bidirectional link failures will be modeled as a set 𝑠 = 𝑙, 𝑙′  
comprising the two opposite directed links 𝑙, 𝑙′ ∈ 𝐿!"#; server failures as a failing link 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿!"#. 
 
To protect against all possible failure scenarios, there are basically two fundamental approaches. The 
first is generally known as failure-independent (FID) rerouting (Y. Liu, Tipper, & Siripongwutikorn, 
2005; Zang, Ou, & Mukherjee, 2003) or state-independent restoration (Xiong & Mason, 2002, 1999): 
the alternate route under any failure condition that impacts the original primary path under failure-free 
circumstances is always the same. This approach is detailed below in its column generation model. 
The second approach, for which we refer to the model in (Develder, Buysse, De Leenheer, Jaumard, 
& Dhoedt, 2012), is named failure-dependent (FD), or state-dependent, restoration: the backup path to 
cater for a specific failure affecting the primary can be tailored to that particular failure. 
 
For the FID case we resort to a column generation model. The so-called restricted master problem 
(RMP) will use a set of configurations as input, deciding how many times to use each configuration to 
meet the given requests while jointly minimizing the server and network capacity. A configuration 𝑐 
will be associated with a given source node 𝑣 and comprise a combination of (i) a so-called working 
path, to use for a request originating at 𝑣 under failure-free conditions, and a (ii) backup path to use 
under any failure scenario that affects the working path. Such configurations will be found by 
subsequently and iteratively solving the pricing problem (PP) as indicated before. To kick-start the 
problem, we clearly have to compose an initial set of configurations that can meet the requests. A 
procedure to find such initial configurations can be found in (Develder et al., 2011). Now, let’s 
specify the RMP and PP formulations. 
 
                                                      
1 Note that this choice is different from the definition of hvv’ in (Develder, Mukherjee, Dhoedt, & 
Demeester, 2009), since there we did not consider resiliency yet, i.e., there was no backup path. 
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The parameters and decision variables of the column generation model are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1. ILP model parameters/variables for the column generation model for Step 2. 
Case ILP model parameters/variables 
Common  • 𝑐 denotes a configuration, which is defined for a particular source node 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉!"#  
• 𝐶! is the set of all such configurations 𝑐 associated with a given source 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉!"#  
• 𝐶 = 𝐶!!∈!!"#  is the set of all considered configurations for any source 
• 𝑆 is the set of SRLGs, each 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 representing a given failure scenario we want 
to protect against  
• 𝑧! is an integer decision variable that counts how many times configuration 𝑐 is 
used 
• 𝑝!"! is a binary parameter, equaling 1 if and only if link 𝑙 is used in the working 
(hence superscript 𝑊) path in configuration 𝑐 
• 𝑝!"!  similarly is a binary parameter that equals 1 if link 𝑙 is used in the backup 
path of 𝑐 
• 𝑤! is an auxiliary variable counting the number of capacity units on link 𝑙. Note 
that ‘capacity’ will denote wavelengths for network links 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿!"#, and number 
of servers for data center links 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿!"#. 
 
Restricted 
Master Problem 
(RMP) 
• 𝜌! is a parameter that will be used in the NR case, for our model’s server links 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿!"# to model 1:𝑁 server protection, where 𝜌! = 1 + 1 𝑁. In any other 
case (for links 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿!"#, or in cases where we do consider relocation even for 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿!"#) we will have 𝜌! = 1. 
• 𝜋!"#!  is a binary parameter that will be 1 if and only if the working path of 
configuration 𝑐 traverses link 𝑙, and this link 𝑙 remains unaffected by failure of 𝑠 
• 𝜋!"#!  is a binary parameter that will be 1 if and only if link 𝑙 is crossed by the 
backup path of configuration 𝑐, while 𝑐 is affected by failure of 𝑠. 
 
Pricing 
Problem (PP) 
• 𝑢!! is the dual variable corresponding to the RMP demand constraint (6), 
• 𝑢!! is the dual variable for the RMP constraint (7) determining working 
capacity,  
• 𝑢!"! is the dual variable for the RMP constraint (8) to satisfy failure scenarios. 
• 𝑎!! is a binary variable that is set to 1 if the working path of the configuration 
is affected by 𝑠, thus, if any of the links 𝑙! ∈ 𝑠 is used on the working path 
(formally: ∃𝑙! ∈ 𝑠: 𝑝!!! = 1). 
• The 𝜋!"! and 𝜋!"!  now will be variables (rather than given parameters), but with 
the same semantics as for the RMP. 
 
 
The restricted master problem (RMP) will fix the values of decision variables 𝑧!. Its objective 
function (5) constitutes two terms, the first being the network capacity and the second the server 
capacity.  
 min 𝑤!!∈!!"# + 𝛼 ∙ 𝑤!!∈!!"#   (5) 
Note that our formulation assumes a linear relation between the server and network requirements 
associated with a request (represented by the demand ∆! associated with source node 𝑣). While the 
formulation can straightforwardly be extended to account for arbitrary server requirements2, we stick 
                                                      
2 E.g., via an extra parameter Γ!, then adding a factor Γ!/∆! to the 𝑧! occurrences in (7)-(8) for links 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿!"#. 
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to the linear relation assumption to not overload the model at this point. The demand requirement 
constraints thus amount to: 
 𝑧!!∈!! ≥ Δ!        ∀𝑣 ∈ 𝑉!"#   (6) 
To determine server capacity in the case where we do not relocate (noted as NR), we can account for 
the extra server resources by quite simply using an overprovisioning factor (rather than modeling 
server failures explicitly via failing links 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿!"#). Therefore, we introduce a given parameter: 
• 𝜌! will be used in the NR case, for our model’s server links 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿!"# to model 1:𝑁 server 
protection, where 𝜌! = 1 + 1 𝑁. In any other case (for links 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿!"#, or in cases where we 
do consider relocation even for 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿!"#) we will have 𝜌! = 1. 
We use this factor in the constraints counting the capacity (wavelengths for 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿!"#, servers for 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿!"#). Constraint (7) determines that capacity for failure-free conditions. For each of the failure 
cases, represented as an SRLG 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, we have capacity lower bounds (8). Herein, we have two 
summations: the first considers all unaffected configurations, the second those that are impacted by 
the failure of 𝑠. The auxiliary parameters (which in this RMP are given, but will become decision 
variables in the configuration finding pricing problem, PP) that we use to determine whether or not a 
configuration is impacted are: 
• 𝜋!"#!  is a binary that will be 1 if and only if the working path of configuration 𝑐 traverses link 𝑙, and this link 𝑙 remains unaffected by failure of 𝑠 
• 𝜋!"#!  is a binary that will be 1 if and only if link 𝑙 is crossed by the backup path of 
configuration 𝑐, while 𝑐 is affected by failure of 𝑠. 
Using these parameters, we have the link dimension constraints3: 
 𝑤! ≥ ρ! ∙ 𝑝!"!!∈! ∙ 𝑧! ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝐿  (7) 
 𝑤! ≥ ρ! ∙ 𝜋!"#!!∈! ∙ 𝑧! + 𝜋!"#!!∈! ∙ 𝑧!  ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆,∀𝑙 ∈ 𝐿\𝑠  (8) 
 
As explained before, solving the above RMP for all possible configurations is not feasible. Starting 
from the latest RMP solution, the pricing problem (PP) will try to find new configurations to 
consider, which can lower the RMP objective function (5). A PP will be associated with a particular 
source node 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉!"# , and will use the values of dual variables corresponding to the RMP constraints: 
• 𝑢!! is the dual variable corresponding to the RMP demand constraint (6), 
• 𝑢!! is the dual variable for the RMP constraint (7) determining working capacity,  
• 𝑢!"! is the dual variable for the RMP constraint (8) to satisfy failure scenarios. 
(Considering the respective position of 𝑧! in regard to the inequality sign in (6)–(8), 𝑢!! will be 
positive, while 𝑢!! and 𝑢!"!  will be negative.) 
 
The PP objective for a given source node 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉!"#  is to minimize the (negative) reduced cost, as 
stated in (9) (where the first explicit zero term is the coefficient of 𝑧! in the RMP objective (5)). The 
decision variables of the PP are the configuration routing variables for working and backup path, 𝑝!! 
resp.  𝑝!!, with the same meaning as before but dropping the 𝑐 index. Also the auxiliary 𝜋 variables 
keep their original meaning, but now are variables that will follow out of the ILP solution (rather than 
a priori given as in the RMP). 
 min 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝,𝜋 = 0 − 𝑢!!"#! + 𝑢!! ∙ ρ! ∙!∈! 𝑝!! + 𝑢!! ∙ ρ! ∙ 𝜋!"! + 𝜋!"!!∈!!∈!   (9) 
The first constraints are the traditional flow constraints, enforcing that the net flow into a node is 
either −1 (for the source node), +1 (for the chosen destination), or 0 otherwise: 
 𝑝!⋆!∈!"(!) − 𝑝!⋆!∈ ! = −1 if  𝑣 = 𝑣!"#𝑝!⋆!∈!"(!)   if  𝑣 ∈ 𝑉!"#0 else   (10) 
                                                      
3 Note that we can in principle omit (7), since the failure-free case could be represented as 𝑠 = ∅. 
Hence constraint (7) can be subsumed in (8) by adding this 𝑠 = ∅ to 𝑆 and noting that for 𝑠 = ∅ we 
have 𝜋!"#! = 𝑝!"! and 𝜋!"#! = 0. Then the corresponding 𝑢!! summation can be removed from the PP 
objective (9). 
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Subsequently, we assure that no loops occur (11) and that exactly one working and one backup 
destination is picked (12). The working and backup paths trivially need to be disjoint in terms of 
possible failure scenarios (13), since we protect against a single SRLG failure. 
 𝑝!⋆!∈!"(!) ≤ 1, 𝑝!⋆!∈!"# ! ≤ 1  ∀𝑣 ∈ 𝑉, ⋆  ∈ 𝑊,𝐵   (11) 
 𝑝!⋆!∈!!"# = 1  for  ⋆  ∈ 𝑊,𝐵   (12) 
 𝑝!! + 𝑝!!! ≤ 1 ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, ∀𝑙, 𝑙! ∈ 𝑠  (13) 
Now we still need to enforce that the 𝜋∗! and 𝜋∗! variables adhere to their definitions as given above. 
Therefore, we introduce additional auxiliaries 𝑎!! associated with an SRLG 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆: 
• 𝑎!! is a binary variable that is set to 1 if the working path of the configuration is affected by 𝑠, 
thus, if any of the links 𝑙! ∈ 𝑠 is used on the working path (formally: ∃𝑙! ∈ 𝑠: 𝑝!!! = 1). 
The definition of 𝜋!"! amounts to the logical equivalence relation 𝜋!"! ≡ 𝑝!! ∧ ¬𝑎!!, which can be 
translated as linear constraints (14). Similarly, 𝜋!"! ≡ 𝑝!! ∧ 𝑎!!, or (15). Finally, logically 𝑎!! can be 
expressed as 𝑎!! ≡ 𝑝!!!!!∈!   , as enforced by (16). 
 
𝜋!"! ≥ 𝑝!! − 𝑎!!𝜋!"! ≤ 𝑝!!𝜋!"! ≤ 1 − 𝑎!! ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, ∀𝑙 ∉ 𝑠  (14) 
 
𝜋!"! ≥ 𝑝!! + 𝑎!! − 1𝜋!"! ≤ 𝑝!!𝜋!"! ≤ 𝑎!! ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, ∀𝑙 ∉ 𝑠  (15) 
 
𝑀 ∙ 𝑎!! ≥ 𝑝!!!!!∈!𝑎!! ≤ 𝑝!!!!!∈! ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 with 𝑀 = 𝑠  (16) 
Thus, the complete PP amounts to (9)–(16), assuming that we allow for relocation. Our case studies 
discussed next will compare that against the case where we do not relocate. In the latter case, we need 
an additional constraint forcing the working and backup path of the configuration to end at the same 
destination: 
 𝑝!!!∈!"(!) = 𝑝!!!∈!"(!) , ∀𝑣 ∈ 𝑉!"# (17) 
As a final remark, we note that our model can easily accommodate unicast requests simultaneously 
with anycast requests, as in (Walkowiak & Rak, 2011). For unicast requests, one simply can enforce 𝑝!! = 𝑝!! = 1 for the particular unicast request’s destination link 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿!"#, and setting 𝑝!!! = 𝑝!!! = 0 
for all other server links 𝑙′ ∈ 𝐿!"# ∖ 𝑙 . In the following we will however consider anycast requests 
only. 
 
Case study set-up 
The basic questions we want to answer are the following: 
• What is the best of our proposed data center location chooser strategies? 
• What is the benefit of exploiting relocation, in terms of cost reduction, where cost is 
expressed as amount of network (wavelength) and server resources? 
• What is the additional benefit of adopting a failure-dependent (FD) rerouting strategy versus a 
failure-independent (FID) rerouting approach? 
To quantitatively answer these questions, we set up experiments on European backbone network 
topologies from (Maesschalck et al., 2003), which all comprise 28 nodes but have varying densities: 
the basic topology has 41 bidirectional links, while the sparse variant only has 34 and the dense one 
60. We consider demands that contain a varying number of unit requests (i.e., asking for a single 
wavelength capacity towards a single server to be instantiated at a data center location of choice). 
Clearly demonstrating the scalability of our solution, the number of unit demands that constitutes a 
particular demand will vary in [10, 350]. Reported results for a particular demand size 𝑥 ∈ 10, 350  
will be averages taken over 10 randomly generated instances of that particular size, where each unit 
request is equally likely to originate from any of the 28 nodes of the EU network. 
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The assessment of the benefit of relocation will be made for two scenarios: (i) single bidirectional 
network link failures only (denoted as 1L), or (ii) single failures that are either one failing 
bidirectional network link, or a single data center failure (1LS). For those data center failures, we will 
consider that up to 1/𝑁th of the server capacity may be impacted. In other words, we will adopt 1:𝑁 
server protection. Using either relocation (RO), or not (NR), we thus consider effectively four 
scenarios: 
• NR: No relocation, implying that to serve a request, the destination data center’s location will 
be identical under a failure or in failure-free conditions 
o 1L: A single bidirectional network link failure implies an SRLG comprising the two 
opposite directed links in the model. 
o 1LSN: Single network link failures will be modeled as for 1L. To cater for single 
server failures, there is however no need to model failures. We can simply calculate 
the extra amount of servers that we need for 1:𝑁 server protection by adopting the 
overprovisioning factor 𝜌! as explained before. 
• RO: When relocation is optional, primary and corresponding backup paths can (but not 
necessarily need to) end at different data centers. The solution of the ILP will determine 
whether or not relocation is beneficial (in terms of cost, i.e., overall network and server 
capacity) for each individual unit request. 
o 1L: Single link failures are modeled as in the NR case. 
o 1LS: Single link failures will be still modeled as SRLGs, and similarly, data center 
failures will be modeled as failures of corresponding server links. Given that we 
adopt 1:𝑁 server protection, we will construct the model to have 1 + 𝑁 parallel links 
to each of the data center nodes. Out of these parallel links to a particular data center, 
at most one will fail, thus the singleton SRLGs corresponding to each modeled link 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿!"# will be considered. 
The resulting settings for the ILP models of Step 2 are summarized below in Table 2. For the RO 
case, it is important to understand that this model indeed amounts to optional relocation, even under 
server failures (i.e., the 1LS case): we offer the choice either to add extra server capacity on a parallel 
link 𝑙′ ∈ 𝐿!"# to the same destination 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉!"#, or to relocate to another server site 𝑣′ ∈ 𝑉!"# ∖ 𝑣  
(possibly implying extra network capacity on the path towards it). 
 
Table 2. Model settings for the various resiliency strategies in Step 2. 
Case ILP model settings 
1L 𝑆 =    𝑙, 𝑙′ : 𝑙, 𝑙! ∈ 𝐿!"# , 𝑙  and  𝑙!  are  each  other's  reverse ≜ 𝑆!! 𝜌! = 1,∀𝑙 ∈ 𝐿 𝐿!"# = 𝐾 (single server link per data center site) 
1LS 𝑆 =   𝑆!! ∪ 𝑙 : 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿!"#  𝜌! = 1,∀𝑙 ∈ 𝐿 𝐿!"# = 1 + 𝑁 ∙ 𝐾 (parallel server links at each data center site) 
1LSN 𝑆 =   𝑆!! 𝜌! = 1 + !!    if 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿!"#, else 1 𝐿!"# = 𝐾 (single server link per data center site) 
 
Quantitative benefits of exploiting relocation and failure-dependent rerouting 
We first address the question which one out of proposed choosers is the best to determine the 𝐾 
locations for data centers. To decide what is “best”, we consider the total cost in terms of joint 
network and server capacity, as expressed by the RMP objective (5). It can be expected that the 
difference will mainly pertain to the network capacity (number of wavelengths summed over all 
links), as the total number of servers (summed over the 𝐾 data centers) required to meet the given 
demand is not expected to depend very much on the location of those servers. 
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Let’s now focus on the cost reduction that the exploitation of relocation can bring. When protecting 
against link failures only (the 1L case), we observe a clear advantage of adopting relocation (RO): for 𝐾 = 3 the total network capacity decreases with around 8.9% (averaged over the larger demand 
instances, ∆!∈ 100, 350 ). The price paid for this network advantage is a slight increase in total 
number of servers: extra capacity needs to be provided at the relocation locations. The net cost 
balance however is still advantageous for RO. When we offer protection also against server failures 
(1LS), the benefit of relocation (see RO-1LS vs NR-1LSN) is substantially more pronounced. Indeed, 
protection against server failures implies backup server capacity (increase with a factor 1 + 1/𝑁 for 
the assumed 1:𝑁 server protection; results are plotted for 𝑁 = 1) in the NR case as well. When 
allowing relocation, i.e., in case of RO, we can however maximally share any backup capacity among 
all failure scenarios (amounting to a factor in the order of 1 + 1/𝐾 for 𝐾 data center locations).  
When we increase the number of data center locations 𝐾, we learn that the relative benefit of 
relocation in terms of network capacity reduction becomes more pronounced (since paths to alternate 
destinations become on average shorter when increasing 𝐾), whereas the penalty of increased server 
capacity dissolves. For larger 𝐾, we see in Table 3 and Figure 4(a) that relocation even allows 
protection against both network and server failures (see RO-1LS) at a lower total cost than we can 
protect against network failures only without relocation (NR-1L). When comparing the results for 
different topologies (results omitted to save space) we find that, as intuitively expected, relocation is 
especially beneficial in sparser topologies: in a sparse network, a backup path towards an alternate 
destination has more chance to be substantially shorter than one towards the original that is disjoint 
from the working path (e.g., think of a ring network). 
 
Table 3. The value of relocation (RO) is that it allows substantial reduction of the required network 
capacity (measured as wavelengths summed over all links), at the cost of extra server capacity. We 
list the relative values compared to the baseline of using no relocation (NR) to protect against single 
link failures (1L) only. Reported values are averages over the demand cases ∆!∈ 100, 350 , for EU-
Basic topology, failure-independent (FID) rerouting and a server cost factor 𝛼 = 1. 
 K Total wavelengths Total servers Total cost 
1L, RO 3 –8.9% +7.5% –5.0% 
 5 –14.3% +6.1% –8.6% 
 7 –18.3% +6.4% –10.5% 
1LS, RO 3 –3.9% +29.9% +4.3% 
 5 –8.9% +20.5% –0.5% 
 7 –11.8% +14.3% –3.2% 
  
The last question concerned the difference between failure-dependent (FD) rerouting and failure-
independent (FID) rerouting. Obviously, the qualitative advantage of relocation is expected to 
continue to hold when applying FD rather than FID. Our results (not included here in detail to save 
space) confirm that expectation. Here we particularly focus on quantifying the expected advantage of 
applying FD over FID. Comparison of FID vs FD in other contexts, i.e., in unicast routing problems 
(thus without an option to resort to relocation), concluded that the potential advantage of adopting FD 
rerouting that can be tailored to each specific failure instance is very limited in terms of total network 
capacity (Xiong & Mason, 2002; Zang et al., 2003). 
Figure 4(b) plots our comparison of FD vs FID in terms of total cost. We note that for the case 
without relocation (NR), the advantage of FD indeed seems limited. However, when we do exploit 
relocation (RO), and then especially to protect against both link and server failures (1LS), the relative 
advantage of FD over FID seems significant (and more so for larger number of data center locations 𝐾). For instance, for 𝐾 = 7 we note a cost reduction of applying FD compared to FID that amounts to 
around 6%. This could very well outweigh the higher operational complexity that FD incurs: FD 
needs to maintain more state (e.g., multiple pre-computed routes to be signaled and stored as routing 
state) and conditional rerouting is required, which implies that the exact failure affecting the working 
path needs to be properly identified (vs unconditional rerouting to the single backup path for FID). 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4. (a) The advantage of relocation increases for larger number of data center locations: the 
network savings increase, while the penalty of higher server capacity diminishes. The net cost of 
protecting against both link and server failures with relocation (RO, 1LS) even is lower than 
protecting against single link failures only without relocating (NR, 1L). 
(b) The advantage of adopting failure-dependent (FD) rerouting, compared to using the same backup 
configuration regardless of failure scenario (FID), is limited when we do not exploit relocation (NR). 
However, when exploiting relocation (RO), the total cost reduction (in terms of combined network 
and server capacity) is more pronounced. The advantage of FD increases for higher number of 
chosen data center locations (increasing K). 
 
 
DISASTER-RESILIENT OPTICAL CLOUDS 
Above, we dealt with the generic problem of resilient cloud network design. Now we discuss 
protection of optical clouds specifically against large-scale disaster failures.  
Whereas traditional studies were more focused on small-scale (e.g., single link/node) failures, 
protection against disaster failures has become a major concern, given their risk of affecting 
communication networks (Neumayer, Zussman, Cohen, & Modiano, 2009; Reuters, 2005). Disasters 
can have natural (earthquakes, tornados, tsunamis, hurricanes, etc.) or human causes  (e.g., weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) and electro-magnetic pulse (EMP)) (Neumayer et al., 2009). In this 
chapter, the main focus of our analysis is optical backbone networks. These networks act as a 
substrate for upper layer networks (e.g., SONET/SDH, Ethernet, IP/MPLS) providing end-to-end 
connectivity and network services (such as cloud computing). Due that dependency on optical 
networks, a disaster that severely disrupts optical backbone networks (implying huge data loss and 
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disruption of high-bandwidth optical channels) thus might cause disruption of essential services for 
weeks and further complicates rescue operation. A few examples: the 2008 China Sichuan earthquake 
caused damage to around 30,000 kilometers of fiber optic cables and 4,000 telecom offices (Ran, 
2011); the 2005 Hurricane Katrina and the flood and power outage following the hurricane caused 
reduction of communication network availability from approximately 99.99% to 85% (Kwasinski, 
Weaver, Chapman, & Krein, 2009); the 2006 Taiwan earthquake caused a fiber-cut and reduced 
Hong-Kong and China’s Internet access capacity by 100% and 74% respectively (Sterbenz, 
Cetinkaya, Hameed, Jabbar, & Rohrer, 2011). Although upper layer schemes (e.g, TCP-layer 
retransmission, IP-layer re-routing) can deal to some extent with network failures, they are not 
capable of dealing with disaster failures as efficiently as physical (e.g., optical) layer schemes: firstly, 
since disaster failures are geographically collocated, physical topology information (more easily 
available at the physical layer) is required to efficiently combat disaster failures, and end-to-end 
mechanisms such as those applied in upper network layers might be ineffective or extremely 
expensive; secondly, a single failure in the optical layer might cause disruption of thousands of upper 
layer connections and services, thus requiring more resources and time to recover in the upper layer.  
 
Optical networks, as previously pointed out, are ideally suited to meet the rising traffic demand from 
clouds. Cloud service providers (e.g., Google, Comcast) have built geo-distributed networks of data 
centers to provide lower latency and reliability through redundancy in case of a failure, and have 
deployed optical backbone networks connecting data centers and the customer networks. Here, we 
consider an optical cloud comprising an optical WDM backbone network providing circuit-switched 
paths for high-bandwidth connections between users and data centers. Cloud services yield new 
opportunities to provide protection against disasters exploiting the anycast principle. Note that, in 
addition to path protection, data center networks also require protection of content, i.e., failure of data 
centers should not cause the disappearance of a specific content/service from the whole network. 
Below, we present a model to design data center networks while providing disaster survivability to 
both paths and content. This model allows effective analysis of the effect of different parameters (e.g., 
protection schemes, number and locations of data centers, number of replicas per content item) on 
disaster survivability as well as resource usage in a data center network.  
 
DESIGN OF DISASTER-RESILIENT OPTICAL DATA CENTER NETWORKS 
Most research on protection in optical networks focused on single-link failures (Ou & Mukherjee, 
2005). Recently, a few studies on multiple failure scenarios have been conducted (Johnston, Lee, & 
Modiano, 2011; Lee, Lee, & Modiano, 2011; Sen, Murthy, & Banerjee, 2009). Traditional backup 
path based protection schemes cannot provide protection against destination (data center) node 
failures. As explained before, introducing backup data centers following the anycast principle can 
reduce bandwidth consumption (Buysse et al., 2009). This scheme does not protect against disasters 
affecting both primary and backup resources (network links and/or data centers). Also, content/service 
protection is a fundamental problem in data center networks. Moreover, location of contents directly 
affects routing performance. Thus, three problems, namely (i) content/service placement, (ii) routing, 
and (iii) protection of paths and content/service should be addressed simultaneously. In this case 
study, we use shared risk groups to define potential disaster zones. A Shared Risk Group (SRG) or 
Disaster Zone (DZ) is defined as a set of nodes and links that might be affected simultaneously by a 
single disaster event. In this case study, we consider placement of a content in DZ-disjoint data 
centers and providing a pair of DZ-disjoint paths (primary and backup) for a mission-critical 
connection requiring high bandwidth and/or low latency; the proposed solutions can easily be 
extended for connections with arbitrary bandwidth requirements by aggregating multiple connections 
using grooming techniques (Zhu & Mukherjee, 2002). (Note that it may be unnecessary to provide 
disaster protection for all services: our study applies to high-priority content and high-bandwidth 
requests that do require such protection.) 
 
Solution approach and problem statement 
We first propose an integrated integer linear program (ILP) to design data center networks and 
provide disaster survivability (i.e., protection against a single disaster event). Our formulation solves 
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the following problems simultaneously: content placement (i.e., replication), as well as routing and 
disaster protection for both paths and content. We consider a circuit-switched optical data center mesh 
network and assume that a single wavelength path is required for each request (extension to arbitrary 
capacity requirements per request is straightforward). To simplify the model, we assume that data 
centers have no constraints on storage and computing capacity. Since ILPs are computationally 
intractable and thus do not scale well, our design strategy is based on relaxations of the ILP and 
heuristics to solve for large problem instances (presented in our previous work (Habib, Tornatore, De 
Leenheer, Dikbiyik, & Mukherjee, 2012)). We formally state the problem as follows: 
Given 
• 𝐺 𝑉,𝐸 : Physical topology comprising the physical node set 𝑉 and the set of directed links 𝐸 
• 𝑉!: Set of data center locations, 𝑉! ⊂ 𝑉 
• 𝑍: Set of disaster zones (DZs) 
• 𝐶: Set of contents 
• 𝑅 = 𝑠, 𝑐   : 𝑅 is the set of anycast requests, 𝑠 ∈ 𝑉, 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 
• 𝐾: Maximum number of replicas per content 
• 𝐵: Capacity of a directed link (every link is assumed to have the same capacity) 
Objective 
• Minimize total wavelength usage 
Output 
• Content placement 
• Disaster-zone-disjoint primary and backup paths for each request 
 
Integrated ILP model for disaster-resilient content placement and routing 
We formulate the problem of assigning paths to high bandwidth connections, determining content 
replica placement, and providing shared protection against a single disaster failure (i.e., multiple 
failures caused by a single disaster) for both paths and contents, using an ILP as shown below. 
Variables 
• 𝑝!"#$! ∈ 0,1 :    Primary (working)  path of request (𝑠, 𝑐) (hence superscript W) goes through 
link 𝑖, 𝑗 ; 𝑠 ∈ 𝑉, 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶     
• 𝑝!"#$! ∈ 0,1 : Backup path of request 𝑠, 𝑐  goes through link 𝑖, 𝑗   ; 𝑠 ∈ 𝑉, 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 
• 𝜏!" ∈ 0,1,2,… : Number of shared wavelengths used in link 𝑖, 𝑗  to support backup paths 
• 𝑟!! ∈ 0,1 : data center 𝑑 ∈ 𝑉′ hosts a replica of content item 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶′  
• 𝑓!"#! ∈ 0,1 :  𝑑 ∈ 𝑉! serves as the primary data center for request 𝑠, 𝑐 , i.e., primary path for 
request 𝑠, 𝑐  is routed to 𝑑 
• 𝑓!"#! ∈ 0,1 :  𝑑 ∈ 𝑉! serves as the backup data center for request 𝑠, 𝑐 , i.e., backup path for 
request 𝑠, 𝑐  is routed to 𝑑  
• 𝑏!"#!" ∈ 0,1 : Backup path of request (𝑠, 𝑐) through link (𝑖, 𝑗) is used when the primary path is 
down due to a  disaster  at 𝑥 ∈ 𝑍 
• 𝛼!!" ∈ 0,1 : Primary path of request (𝑠, 𝑐) is down due to a disaster at 𝑥 ∈ 𝑍 
• 𝛽!!" ∈ 0,1 : Backup path of request (𝑠, 𝑐) is down due to a disaster at 𝑥 ∈ 𝑍 
 
Using the variables, the objective becomes: 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑝!"#$!!,!!,! + 𝜏!"!,!  
Here, the first term minimizes resources used to provision primary paths and the second term 
minimizes resources used to provision shared backup paths. 
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Flow-Conservation Constraints 
𝑝!"#$!!:(!,!)∈! − 𝑝!"#$! = 1−𝑓!"#!0             !: !,! ∈! if  i == sif  𝑖   ∈ 𝑉!otherwise          ∀ 𝑠, 𝑐 ∈ 𝑅,∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑉 (18) 
𝑝!"#$!!:(!,!)∈! − 𝑝!"#$! = 1−𝑓!"#!0             !: !,! ∈! if  i == sif  𝑖   ∈ 𝑉!otherwise          ∀ 𝑠, 𝑐 ∈ 𝑅,∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑉 (19) 𝑓!"#!!∈!! = 1                ∀ 𝑠, 𝑐 ∈ 𝑅 (20) 
𝑓!"#!!∈!! = 1                ∀ 𝑠, 𝑐 ∈ 𝑅 (21) 
Equations (18) and (19) enforce flow conservation on primary and backup paths, respectively. 
Following the anycast principle, the primary and backup data centers are not fixed, as represented by 
variables 𝑓!"#!  and 𝑓!"#!  in eq. (18) resp. (19). Equations (20) and (21) constrain the number of primary 
and backup data centers to one. 
 
Data center assignment and content placement 𝑟!! ≥ 𝑓!"#! + 𝑓!"#!        ∀𝑐 ∈ 𝐶,∀𝑑 ∈ 𝑉!,∀ 𝑠, 𝑐 ∈ 𝑅 (22) 𝑟!!!∈!! ≤ 𝐾       ∀𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 (23) 
Equation (22) ensures that (i) a data center 𝑑 is not used to serve a request (s,c) if it does not host 
content 𝑐 and (ii) primary and backup data centers of a request are different. Equation (23) constrains 
the number of replicas per content. 
Capacity Constraint 𝑝!"#$! + 𝜏!"!,! ≤ 𝐵       ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐸 (24) 
Equation (24) constrains link capacity. The computation of 𝜏!" will be explained later. 
 
Disaster-zone-disjoint path constraint                                                          !!"#$!!,! ∈!! ≤ 𝛼!!" ≤ 𝑝!"#$!!,! ∈!        ∀ 𝑠, 𝑐 ∈ 𝑅,∀𝑧 ∈ 𝑍 (25) !!"#$!!,! ∈!! ≤ 𝛽!!" ≤ 𝑝!"#$!!,! ∈!        ∀ 𝑠, 𝑐 ∈ 𝑅,∀𝑧 ∈ 𝑍 (26) 𝛼!!" + 𝛽!!" ≤ 1       ∀ 𝑠, 𝑐 ∈ 𝑅,∀𝑧 ∈ 𝑍 (27) 
Equations (8) and (9) set the value of 𝛼!!" and 𝛽!!", respectively. Here, M is a large integer constant 
(i.e., greater than the maximum possible numerator ( 𝑝!"#$!!,! ∈!  and 𝑏!"#$!!,! ∈! )). By definition, 𝛼!!" (𝛽!!") is 1 if at least one link on the primary (backup) path for request (𝑠, 𝑐) goes through DZ 𝑧. 
Equation (10) ensures that primary and backup paths are DZ-disjoint. 
 
Shared Protection Constraint  𝜏!" ≥ 𝑏!"#!"!,!        ∀ 𝑖, j ∈ 𝐸,∀𝑧 ∈ 𝑍 (28) 𝑏!"#!" ≤  𝛼!!"     ∀ 𝑠, 𝑐 ∈ 𝑅,∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐸,∀𝑧 ∈ 𝑍 (29) 𝑏!"#!" ≤ 𝑝!"#$!        ∀ 𝑠, 𝑐 ∈ 𝑅,∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐸,∀𝑧 ∈ 𝑍 (30) 𝑏!"#!" ≥ 𝛼!!" + 𝑝!"#$! − 1       ∀ 𝑠, 𝑐 ∈ 𝑅,∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐸,∀𝑧 ∈ 𝑍 (31) 
Equations (28)-(31) bound the number of shared wavelengths used in a link for protection. Combining 
the objective and eq. (28), we get 𝜏!" = max! 𝑏!"#!"!,! . The example shown in Figure 5 explains the 
computation of 𝜏!". Here, we have three requests with primary paths: 1-2-3-4, 8-3-4, and 8-7-6; and 
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corresponding backup paths: 1-9-5, 8-9-5, and 8-9-5. The backup data centers are different from the 
primary ones. Circles A and B represent two DZs. Link (9, 5) is shared by all three backup paths. 
Failure of DZ A affects primary paths 1-2-3-4 and 8-3-4; and failure of DZ B affects primary path 8-
7-6. Thus, 𝑏!"!!"!,! = 2 and 𝑏!"!!"!,! = 1. We get, 𝜏!" = 𝑚𝑎𝑥!∈ !,! 𝑏!"#!"!,! = 2. So, only 
two shared wavelengths on link 9-5 are needed to provide protection for all three requests.  
  
 
Figure 5. Computation of 𝜏!", which denotes the number of shared wavelengths used in link (i, j) to 
provide backup paths for connections disrupted by a disaster failure.  
 
This ILP does not explicitly include constraints to provide protection for content. Assuming that each 
content is requested by at least one request, and also noting that primary and backup paths for a 
request are DZ-disjoint and connect to two different data centers, it is ensured that content is 
replicated at disaster-disjoint data centers. 
 
Relaxations of the integrated ILP 
To solve the problem for large networks, we propose two relaxations of the integrated ILP:  
• Two-Step ILP: We introduce separate but interlaced ILP formulations for content placement 
and routing.  
• LP Relaxations: The relaxed two-step ILP, obtained by relaxing the integrality constraint of 
the variables, gives us a lower bound on the optimal. Since the LP-relaxed solution may not 
be a feasible one, we propose heuristics to find a feasible solution from the LP-relaxed 
solution 
 
Two-Step ILP 
Here, we consider content placement with content protection and routing with path protection as 
separate processes, and propose two separate ILPs for these two problems. This ILP allows us to 
handle larger networks with more connections as it has lower complexity than the integrated one. 
	  
Step	  1:	  Content	  placement	  with	  content	  protection	  
This ILP uses a heuristic objective that minimizes the average distance from the requesting nodes to 
the data center nodes for all the requests. As a result, this objective tends to place content in data 
centers closer to its popular region, which reduces resource usage by primary and backup paths while 
routing connection requests. We pre-compute ℎ!", which is the minimum number of hops to reach 
node d from node s.  
Objective	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  min   ℎ!"𝑟!!!"∈!!∈!! 	  
Constraints  𝑟!!!∈!! ≤ 𝐾       ∀𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 (32) 𝑟!!!∈! ≤ 1       ∀𝑐 ∈ 𝐶,∀𝑧 ∈ 𝑍 (33) 
Equation (33) bounds the number of replicas to k. Equation (32) ensures that no DZ can have more 
than one replica of a content item.  	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Step	  2:	  Routing	  with	  path	  protection	  
We derive the ILP for routing by eliminating eq. (23) from the integrated formulation and using 
constant values for 𝑅!! s as found from Step 1.  
 
LP Relaxation 
One way to make an ILP more scalable is LP relaxation: remove the integrality constraints on 
variables and then solve the corresponding Linear Program (LP). The search space of the LP includes 
the search space of the ILP, so LP relaxation provides a lower bound on the optimal solution. As some 
constraints are relaxed in the LP formulation, we may obtain an infeasible solution, particularly since 
this solution may give fractional values for the variables (some of which should be integers in reality). 
Heuristics can be used to obtain a feasible solution for the original ILP problem from the infeasible 
relaxed solution.  
 
As there is no constraint on the storage capacity of data centers in the ILP to solve the content 
placement problem (i.e., Step 1 of two-step ILP), the placement of a content item does not depend on 
the placement of other contents. Thus, each item can be replicated separately. This ILP uses a 
heuristic objective which tends to place an item in data centers closer to its popular region. Thus, 
instead of LP relaxation, we propose Algorithm 1, which solves the content placement problem (one 
item at a time) to achieve the same objective in polynomial time. 
 
Basically, for a specific content item and a specific data center location, we consider the requests for 
the item and compute the average shortest distance of that data center from the requesting nodes. We 
sort the data centers in non-decreasing order of the computed distances and replicate content into data 
centers in succession following the order of the sorted list and maintaining constraint (38).  
 
We apply LP relaxation on the routing problem (i.e., Step 2 of the two-step ILP). We relax all the 
integer variables. Note that, as the relaxed solution may give fractional values for variables, we may 
have multiple primary paths and multiple backup paths for each connection request.  
 
We propose Algorithm 2 to derive a feasible solution for a request (𝑠, 𝑐) from the infeasible relaxed 
one. Here, SP is the pre-computed set of k-shortest paths from node 𝑠 to each of the data center nodes. 
Using any polynomial time search algorithm, we can find the set of primary paths, 𝑃, and backup 
paths, 𝐵, from the relaxed solution. Here, 𝛼!! 𝛽!!  is equal to 1 if primary path 𝑝 (backup path 𝑏) goes 
through DZ i. Then, we compute 𝑚𝑎𝑥! 𝛼!!×𝛽!!  for each possible pair (𝑝, 𝑏), 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵. If 𝑚𝑎𝑥! 𝛼!!×𝛽!! = 0 for a pair (𝑝, 𝑏), then p and b are DZ-disjoint paths. We compute set S which 
holds those pairs (𝑝, 𝑏) having 𝑚𝑎𝑥! 𝛼!!×𝛽!! = 0. If 𝑆 is not empty, we take the pair that consumes 
the least amount of resources (sum of primary and backup wavelengths to provide shared protection). 
To compute maximum sharing for a path, we use the procedure in Chapter 11 of (Mukherjee, 2006). 
If 𝑆 is empty, we do not have any DZ-disjoint pair of paths from the sets 𝑃 and 𝐵. We then take the 
least-cost primary path from 𝑃, and compute candidateB as the set of paths 𝑏′ ∈ 𝑆𝑃 such that 𝑏′ is 
DZ-disjoint to p. If candidateB is not empty, we take a path b from it such that (𝑝, 𝑏) pair consumes  
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Algorithm 1: Content Placement 
Input: 
T: Set of user requests (s, c) for content c 
Vʹ: Set of data center locations 
hsd: Minimum number of hops to reach node d 
from node s  
Output: 
Lc: Set of replica locations for content c 
1. for each 𝑑 ∈ 𝑉! do 
2.     𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡! = ℎ!"!,! ∈!  
3. end for 
4. Sort all data centers in non-decreasing order 
of  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡! 
5. 𝑖 = 1, 𝑛 =number of data centers 
6. while Lc does not have k members and 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 
do 
7.     Add i’th data center from the sorted list   
    into Lc if it does not violate constraint (38) 
8.     𝑖 = 𝑖 + 1 
9. end while 
 Algorithm 2: Routing: Compute primary and backup 
paths for the given request from relaxed LP solution 
Input: 
(s, c): User request with s as requesting node and c as 
content 
P: Set of primary paths found for (s, c) from relaxed 
ILP 
B: Set of backup paths found for (s, c) from relaxed ILP 
SP: Set of k shortest paths from node s to all data 
centers 𝛼!!: Primary path 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃 for (s, c) passes DZ i 𝛽!!: Backup path 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 for (s, c) passes DZ i 
PP: Set of already-provisioned primary paths 
PB: Set of already-provisioned backup paths 
Output: 
(bestP, bestB): primary path bestP and backup path 
bestB 
1. Compute 𝑆 = 𝑝, 𝑏 :𝑚𝑎𝑥! 𝛼!!×𝛽!! = 0; 𝑝 ∈𝑃, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵  
2. if S is not empty and for at least one pair in S, all 
links on the two paths have enough capacity, then 
3.     Take lowest cost pair 𝑝!, 𝑏′ ∈ 𝑆 such that all    
    links on the two paths have enough capacity. Set      
    𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑃 = 𝑝! and 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐵 = 𝑏′. 
4. else 
5.     if P is empty then 
6.         GOTO Step 20. 
7.     end if 
8.     Take lowest-cost primary path 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑃 ∈ 𝑃 such     
     that all links on 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑃 have enough capacity.    
     Set 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑃 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑃. 
9.     Compute 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵 = 𝑏!: 𝑏! ∈ 𝑆𝑃, 𝑏!is    
    disaster-zone-disjoint to 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑃. 
10.     if candidateB is not empty and for at least one      
    path of candidateB, all links on that path have     
    enough capacity, then 
11.         Take least-cost pair 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑃, 𝑏′  where                   𝑏! ∈ 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵 and links on 𝑏! have   
        enough capacity. Set best𝐵 = 𝑏′. 
12.     else 
13.         From the topology graph find (if possible) a    
        shortest path 𝑏′, disaster-zone-disjoint to   
        bestP, from node S to any of the data center   
        nodes that has content c. Set 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐵 = 𝑏′.  
14.         if bestB not found then 
15.             Delete minP from P. GOTO Step 5. 
16.         end if 
17.     end if 
18. end if 
19. if 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑃, 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐵  not found then 
20.     Use Algorithm 3 to compute bestPrimary and   
    bestBackup. Set bestP=bestPrimary and   
    bestB=bestBackup 
21. end if 
 
 
 
 
Algorithm 3: Compute primary and backup 
paths for a request 
Input: 
(s, c): User request with s as requesting node and 
c as content 
SP: Set of k shortest paths from node s to all data 
centers 
PP: Set of already-provisioned primary paths 
PB: Set of already-provisioned backup paths 
Output: 
bestPrimary: Primary path 
bestBackup: Backup path 
minCost: Cost of the pair (bestPrimary, 
bestBackup) 
1. 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = ∞ 
2. 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 = 𝑁𝑈𝐿𝐿 
3. 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑢𝑝 = 𝑁𝑈𝐿𝐿 
4. for each path 𝑝! ∈ 𝑆𝑃 do 
5.     if all links on 𝑝! have enough capacity, 
    then      
6.         for each path 𝑝! ∈ 𝑆𝑃 do 
7.             if all links on 𝑝! have enough   
            capacity and 𝑝! and 𝑝! are DZ-  
            disjoint then 
8.                 if minCost > cost(𝑝! + 𝑝!) then 
9.                     bestPrimary=𝑝!,   
                    bestBackup=𝑝!. 
10.                     minCost = cost(𝑝! + 𝑝!) 
11.                 end if 
12.             end if 
13.         end for 
14.     end if 
15.  end for 
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lowest cost. If candidateB is empty, we delete the links on p from the topology, and find a shortest 
path from the modified topology as backup path. If a backup path is not found, we delete the primary 
path from P, take the least-cost primary path from P, compute candidateB for the new primary path, 
and repeat the steps. If none of these works, we use Algorithm 3 to compute the paths, which we 
explain below.  
 
Heuristic 
Here, we explore non-mathematical heuristic approaches to solve the problem for large problem 
instances. We consider a static-traffic case, where all requests are known beforehand, yet, these 
heuristics can also be applied for dynamic traffic, where requests arrive and are processed one-by-one. 
For content placement with disaster protection, we propose Algorithm 1, as previously discussed. 
Algorithm 3 shows the heuristic to compute DZ-disjoint primary and backup paths for a given request (𝑠, 𝑐). The k shortest paths from node 𝑠 to all data center nodes are pre-computed. Thus, if we have 𝑟  replica locations for content 𝑐, we have 𝑘×𝑟 paths to be considered for request (𝑠, 𝑐). The heuristic 
considers all possible pairs of paths and selects the lowest-cost disaster-disjoint pair as solution. Cost 
of a pair of paths is the sum of the number of wavelengths used for the primary path and additional 
wavelengths used for shared backup path. For a comparison of the running times of the proposed 
methods, we refer to (Habib, Tornatore, De Leenheer, Dikbiyik, & Mukherjee, 2012). 
 
Illustrative numerical examples 
We present illustrative results by solving the ILP formulations and heuristics on NSFNet and 
COST239 networks shown in Figures 6(a) and 6(b). Existing studies show that a disaster zone (DZ) 
can span up to 160 km (Weems, 2003). Following this, we randomly specify 14 DZs for NSFNet and 
7 DZs for COST239. The COST239 network is denser (i.e., shorter link lengths and higher 
connectivity) than NSFNet. The maximum number of wavelengths per link is 32. We compare three 
protection schemes: dedicated single-link failure (SLF) protection (i.e., dedicated path protection 
against a single link failure), shared single-link failure (SLF) protection (i.e., shared path protection 
against a single link failure), and the proposed shared disaster zone failure (DZF) protection (i.e., 
shared path protection against a single disaster-zone failure). In all three schemes, the primary and 
backup data centers for a request are always different. The formulations for dedicated and shared SLF 
protection can be easily derived from our disaster protection model with minor changes.  
 
 
(a) NSF Net (Average link length = 1936 km, 
Average node degree = 3.14) 
 
(b) Cost239 (Average link length = 578 
km, Average node degree = 4.73) 
Figure 6. Topologies used in the study (DZs in circles, link lengths in km). 
 
Results from the integrated ILP model 
We present the impacts of protection scheme, number of data centers, and number of content replicas 
on network resource (i.e., wavelength) usage. The traffic matrix used in the simulations is generated 
randomly and uniformly distributed among network nodes. 
  
1) Protection scheme: We first compare the wavelength usage of the three schemes. For both 
NSFNet and COST239, we have 3 data centers, 10 content items, and unconstrained number of 
replicas per item. For NSFNet, the data centers are located at nodes 2, 6, and 9; and for COST239, the 
data centers are located at nodes 4, 5, and 9. Data center locations are chosen in a way such that at 
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least one of the data centers is at most two hops away from a node in the network. Figure 7(a-b) 
compares the wavelength usage for shared DZF protection with dedicated and shared SLF protection.  
 
 
(a) NSF Net 
 
(b) Cost239 
 
 
(c) NSF Net 
 
(d) Cost239 
Figure 7. Total wavelength usage (a-b) and number of unprotected paths (c-d) for three schemes 
using integrated ILP. 
 
We see that shared DZF protection uses more wavelengths than shared SLF protection but fewer than 
dedicated SLF protection. Dedicated SLF protection has more probability of being survivable in case 
of multiple random link failures than shared SLF protection. But, in reality, failures of multiple non-
correlated links are quite unlikely. Rather, it is more likely that a set of correlated links/nodes are 
down simultaneously due to a disaster. Though disaster protection provides more protection, it is not a 
popular choice as it consumes significantly higher resources than protection against a single link 
failure. But we find that disaster protection exploiting anycast in a data center network consumes 
moderate resources while providing the required protection. As the average hop distance between two 
nodes is less in COST239 than in NSFNet, we find that the wavelength usage is less in COST239 than 
in NSFNet. 
 
Figure 7(c-d) shows that, without DZF protection, a significant number of connections are vulnerable 
to disaster failures, even though data centers are distantly located in the network, and primary and 
backup data centers are different in all the three cases. With the same primary and backup data center, 
the connections are never protected against destination (data center) node failure. These results 
indicate that shared DZF protection, although it uses fewer resources, provides more protection 
against disasters than dedicated SLF protection. Figure 8(c-d) shows that the number of paths 
vulnerable to disasters is higher in COST239 than in NSFNet because COST239 is denser with 
shorter links than NSFNet. The denser a network is, the more vulnerable it is to a disaster failure. 
 
2) Number of replicas: Table 4 shows the effect of number of content replicas on wavelength usage 
using shared DZF protection in NSFNet. To experiment with more replicas, we use four data centers 
at nodes 2, 5, 9, and 11. We compare the wavelength usage between 4 replicas per content item (i.e., 
every item is replicated in every data center) and 2 replicas per item. Note that with a small increase 
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in wavelength usage, the number of replicas can be decreased significantly. Based on user demands, 
replicas are distributed throughout the network, which allows flexibility to choose primary and 
backup data centers. More replicas do not always provide more flexibility to choose a shorter path; 
rather more replicas mean more usage of storage resources and more usage of bandwidth to perform 
replication and synchronization (i.e., consistency among replicas of a content).  
 
 # Requests 
20 25 30 
4 replicas per content 49 64 75 
2 replicas per content 55 73 83 
Table 4. Wavelength usage in shared DZF 
protection for different numbers of replicas in 
NSFNet using Integrated ILP. 
 
# Data centers 2 3 4 5 
# Wavelengths 62 45 37 33 
 
Table 5. Wavelength usage in shared DZF 
protection for different numbers of replicas in 
NSFNet using Integrated ILP. 
 
 
3) Number of data centers: Table 5 shows the effect of the number of data centers on wavelength 
usage in shared protection with unconstrained number of replicas in NSFNet. For two data centers, we 
use locations 5 and 9; for three data centers, we use 2, 5, and 9; for four data centers, we use 2, 5, 9, 
and 11; and for five data centers, we use locations 2, 5, 6, 9, and 11. In this result, the number of 
wavelengths reduces significantly as the number of data centers increases, but after a certain value, 
increasing the number of data centers does not help much to reduce wavelength utilization. We 
conclude that a reasonable number of data centers with intelligent network design can provide 
survivability to disasters while supporting user demands. 
 
Performance of relaxed formulations and heuristics 
To check the performance of the two-step ILP, we compare its wavelength usage with that of the 
integrated ILP on NSFNet for 30 connections, 5 data centers (2, 6, 7, 11, and 14), and 3 replicas per 
content. Figure 8(a) shows that the performance of the two-step ILP is quite close to that of the 
integrated ILP. Here, DP, SP, and SDZP are short forms for dedicated SLF protection, shared SLF 
protection, and shared DZF protection, respectively. For different protection schemes, the wavelength 
usage in the two-step ILP is 2.5% to 10.4% more than that in the integrated ILP. Note that the result 
of the two-step ILP is closer to what can be achieved in a real-world scenario where future requests 
are not known beforehand and replication is done separately from routing. We find that the two-step 
ILP is more scalable in the number of connections than the integrated ILP. We compared the 
performance of two-step ILP, relaxed two-step ILP, and heuristics as shown in Figure 8(b) and found 
that their performance is quite close to each other. For more details of these results, we refer to (Habib 
et al., 2012). 
 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 8. (a) Comparison of two-step ILP with integrated ILP for NSF Net. (b) Comparison of two-
step ILP, relaxed two-step ILP, and heuristics for NSF Net. 
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CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
Cloud services are today integral part of our society. Considering the increasing dependency of social 
and financial activities on clouds, disruption of cloud services due to failure of data center network 
resources can be catastrophic. In this chapter, we proposed schemes to dimension optical clouds 
resilient to failures. We considered protection of both network connections and content and showed 
how anycasting and relocation can be exploited to provide protection in an optical cloud. From the 
two studies we presented in detail, we conclude two lessons learned: (1) The classical optical network 
dimensioning models (cf. routing and wavelength assignment, RWA) need to be reworked to deal 
with the fact that the end point of traffic flows is flexible and not a priori known (cf. anycast), and (2) 
The network infrastructure should not be designed independently of the server infrastructure (i.e., data 
centers). The proposed schemes confirm the necessity of further research on optical cloud resiliency 
and provide a solid base to investigate and build up new protection schemes for both traffic and 
content in cloud networks. We mention here some relevant issues that need to be addressed while 
designing a protection scheme for optical clouds.  
 
In this study, we have considered static traffic to design and analyze the characteristic of a data center 
network. A dynamic scenario is more complex. First, connections have a finite lifetime and thus 
available network capacity and topology may be changing frequently. Routing should not only 
consider the instantaneously available resources, but rather also the (near) future availability to 
achieve better optimization. Secondly, content popularity may vary over time, requiring to make new 
replicas or remove old replicas for it. Opportunities and challenges deriving from the dynamicity of 
combined content placement and connection routing must be investigated. Even though the 
relaxations and heuristics we discussed can be applied for the dynamic traffic with some 
modifications, more in-depth research needs to be conducted.  
 
We modeled potential disaster zones as shared risk groups (SRGs). Generally this model can be 
applied when the location and the span of a disaster is known beforehand. For example, seismic 
hazard maps (Petersen & others, 2008) provide information regarding potential earthquake zones and 
seismic hazard levels, which can be used to define SRGs in a network graph. In reality, the probability 
of the occurrence of a disaster at a region varies with time. Due to advanced scientific methods, 
occurrence of some disasters can now be predicted beforehand (e.g., an incoming hurricane can be 
reasonably forecast at least one day in advance, leaving to the network operator an chance to re-
organize its network to withstand the impending damages). Path provisioning and content placement 
algorithms should be made able to dynamically capture this information to increase disaster resilience. 
Post-failure network management can also enable higher resource utilization in a cloud network by 
reprovisioning the already provisioned requests. Multipath routing enables a connection to be 
multiplexed onto multiple paths whereas traffic grooming enables aggregation of multiple small flows 
into a larger flow that can be switched along a single path. Both of these techniques have been 
extensively studied in optical WDM networks. In a data center network with anycast services, 
multipath routing and traffic grooming can play a crucial role to effectively provide disaster 
survivability with limited additional resource usage (overprovisioning). 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
ARWA Anycast Routing and Wavelength Assignment  
CG Column Generation 
DP Dedicated SLF Protection 
DZ Disaster Zone 
DZF Disaster Zone Failure  
EMP Electro-Magnetic Pulse 
FD Failure Dependent 
FID Failure InDependent  
HPC High Performance Computing  
IaaS Infrastructure-as-a-Service 
ILP Integer Linear Program 
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IP Internet Protocol 
IT Information Technology 
LHC Large Hadron Collider  
LP Linear Program  
MPLS Multi Protocol Label Switch 
NR No Relocation 
OBS Optical Burst Switching 
OCS Optical Circuit Switching 
OXC Optical Cross-Connect 
PP Pricing Problem 
RMP Restricted Master Problem  
RO RelOcation 
RWA Routing and Wavelength Assignment 
SC Shortest Cycle 
SDZP Shared DZF Protection 
SLF Single-Link Failure 
SRG Shared Risk Group 
SRLG Shared Risk Link Group 
SP Shared SLF Protection 
SW Shortest Working 
TCP Transmission Congestion Protocol 
VM Virtual Machine 
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KEY TERMS & DEFINITIONS 
Anycast routing:  Anycast routing specifically enables users to transmit information (for processing, 
storage or service delivery), without a priori assigning an explicit destination. This offers the service 
provider the flexibility to select “the most appropriate” destination, and thus this freedom can be 
exploited to realize e.g., load balancing. Yet, this also introduces more complex routing decisions. 
 
Cloud Computing:  Distributed computing paradigm, building on key concepts of grid computing, but 
manifesting itselves in more commercially oriented applications that often involve loosely coupled 
tasks, and are typically interactive. A key concept that clouds heavily build on is that of virtualization: 
physical infrastructure (e.g., servers) are logically partitioned so that multiple users/applications can 
share the capacity, thus providing extra scalability. 
 
Grid Computing:  Distributed computing infrastructure, providing coordination of resources that are 
not subject to centralized control, using standard, open, general-purpose protocols and interfaces, and 
delivers non-trivial qualities of service (QoS). 
 
Routing and wavelength allocation (RWA):  In optical wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) 
networks, traffic flows over so-called lightpaths: on each physical link, bits are transported over a 
given wavelength. For a given amount of traffic, each demand from a source s to a destination d has to 
follow a given route (i.e., sequence of links from s to d) and on each of these links the wavelength to 
be used has to be chosen (and has to be the same if switches cannot convert one wavelength to 
another, thus enforcing a so-called wavelength continuity constraint). This  
 
Shared risk (link) group (SRG, SRLG):  An SRG captures the concept that different network resources 
may be jointly impacted by a certain failure if they are sharing a common risk: an SRG is a group of 
resources that thus fail simultaneously when the common risk occurs. An SRLG is a particular 
example where the resources are network links: e.g., if fibers are grouped in ducts, an accident 
causing the duct to break will impact all fibers crossing it. 
 
